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Competitive Screening and Market Segmentation

2006-09-15

Gerald D. Jaynes | Department of Economics Yale University

: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University

29 pages
Discussion paper

http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

주제정보

초록

We characterize competitive equilibrium in markets (financial etc.) where price taking Bayesian decision makers screen to accept or reject applicants. Unlike signaling models, equilibrium fails to resolve imperfect information. In classical

참고문헌

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